contributed by Una Nancy Owen
Our system of government has chosen to favour the Idea of majority rule - the members of the States vote on a measure, and it is passed if a simple numerical majority is obtained. Yet I would contend that such a majority rule is, at present, a fickle system of government, leading as it does to decisions which may be based on a very slender majority.
I would argue, then, that a more stable government is needed, and that this is best achieved not by majority rule, pure and simple, but by a "limited" majority rule whereby there must be a majority that equals or exceeds a specified limit - such as two thirds - before legislation is passed. At present, such a system could be put into practice by the simple expedient of taking a simple majority to signify that a measure could be passed, yet as a voluntary act, not taking that alone as justification for implementing it. In other words, the responsible statesman would consider a vote to be a vote of confidence, and would not enact the legislation until such time as a firm majority was reached.
It is perhaps relevant to this issue to make a brief comment on majority rule and democracy. Historically, the democratic system developed together with the idea of majority rule, both in England and in Jersey. However, this historical connection is the only link between democracy and majority rule, and is, therefore, accidental rather than necessary - there is no logical connection between the two. For majority rule is a method employed by the government to reach decisions, whereas democracy is simply a method of electing that government, in which the members of government ask for the confidence of the people at intervals; the former belongs to the inner mechanism of government, while the latter is an external mechanism for selecting the government. This is clearly seen if we look at other inner mechanisms such as the process of committee government in Jersey. It is easy to see that the various States committees responsible for areas of government are local to Jersey, and are not uniquely found in all democracies. So, equally, the inner mechanism of majority rule will not be a unique part of democracy. How a government chooses to govern when elected has nothing to do with the fact that it is elected, except insofar as the results - not the decision making methods - are accountable to the electorate.
What is wrong with majority rule? It is not easy to see the weakness in this method as applied in England or Jersey, but it becomes apparent if we look at the nations of Africa. In a number of African nations, governments are democratically elected, then a majority takes power, and uses majority rule in much the same way as a tyrant uses his power. How can this be? If an African nation has two tribal groups, and one is larger than the other, then - because of tribal loyalties - one group has an inbuilt majority. They know that any election can only confirm that majority and that they are in no real sense accountable to the whole electorate, but only to their tribe. They are therefore free to oppress the other tribe, using political, legal and economic means to ensure their dominance. The result may be that the oppressed minority will often resort to violence and, as a consequence, the democratic foundations of the nation are blown to bits. Any system that applies simple majority rule faces the same danger - the menace of a self-interested majority group. And while no such groups are openly visible in Jersey, it would be folly to suppose that there did not exist such groups. It is the nature of man to form social attachments, and in government, political ones; it is the nature of the politician to form secret alliances. We read such a picture in Tolstoy, and it is clearly drawn from life. From simple loyalty of friendship to the sharing of vested interests, it-is in the very nature of things for political groups (understood as "lobbies" not "parties") to arise, however covertly, and so undermine the idea of majority rule. In Jersey, it is worth noting that committees and the necessary liaison between committees must surely promote a sort of "departmental" loyalty; this threatens the idea of majority rule as best for decisions.
The solution - as the solution would also exist for African nations - is to be found in constitutional safeguards which order the decision-making methods of government. In particular, if the simple majority rule is replaced with a "limited" majority rule, such as two thirds of votes needed, this threshold can protect the minority groups and render the majority group's influence innocuous - insofar as it would otherwise act out of proportion. Obviously, this has the danger that it may be more difficult to implement beneficial measures that would interfere with the wishes of a minority. Yet, on the whole, I am inclined to the view that it is better than a simple majority rule. For if change is for the better, then it is the task of those proposing change to convince others, rather than weight the balance in favour of change. It is in general surely best to prefer what is tried and tested to what is new and untested. In this respect, a "limited" majority rule with a threshold above half is most advantageous; it acts as a check on novelty, and a force for stability.